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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on an appeal from a 
judgment of conviction and sentence entered on November 
4, 1998, in the district court. The appellant, David 
Christopher McKenzie, pleaded guilty to an indictment 
charging him with a violation of 8 U.S.C. SS 1326(a) and 
(b)(2) by knowingly and willfully re-entering the United 
States after being deported subsequent to his conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony. The district court 
sentenced McKenzie to a term of 41 months imprisonment 
to be followed by a two-year term of supervised release. 
 
The background of the case is as follows. McKenziefirst 
entered the United States from Jamaica in 1986. On April 
17, 1990, McKenzie was convicted in the Circuit Court of 
Prince George's County, Maryland, for felony possession of 
crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it. The state 
court sentenced McKenzie to a three-year term of 
imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of 
probation. The court, however, suspended two years and 
three months of the prison term. On October 26, 1996, 
McKenzie was arrested in the District of Columbia and 
charged with possession of an unlicensed and unregistered 
pistol and possession of ammunition. McKenzie, however, 
was not prosecuted for these alleged offenses as the 
government instead instituted proceedings against him 
leading to his deportation to Jamaica on June 3, 1997. 
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The events leading directly to this prosecution may be 
traced to May 8, 1998, when McKenzie arrived at Newark 
International Airport on a flight from Jamaica with an 
altered passport in someone else's name. McKenzie 
admitted to the immigration officers that he was not the 
owner of the passport, and that he had been deported for 
drug and weapons offenses. The prosecution culminating in 
this appeal followed. 
 
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2 the district court calculated 
McKenzie's total offense level as 21, which, with a criminal 
history category of II, yielded a sentencing range of 41 to 51 
months. The computations were as follows. First, U.S.S.G. 
S 2L1.2(a) established a base offense level of 8. Then there 
was a 16-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because of McKenzie's conviction for an 
aggravated felony. Thus, McKenzie's adjusted offense level 
was 24. The court, however, made a 3-level reduction in 
calculating the total offense level for acceptance of 
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. SS 3E1.1(a) and (b). 
McKenzie does not object to any of these calculations. 
 
McKenzie, however, requested a 2-level downward 
departure pursuant to Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. 
S 2L1.2, which provides that: 
 
       Aggravated felonies that trigger the adjustment from 
       subsection (b)(1)(A) vary widely. If subsection (b)(1)(A) 
       applies, and (A) the defendant has previously been 
       convicted of only one felony offense; (B) such offense 
       was not a crime of violence or firearms offense; and (C) 
       the term of imprisonment imposed for such offense did 
       not exceed one year, a downward departure may be 
       warranted on the seriousness of the aggravated felony. 
 
It is that request that brings us to the crux of this appeal 
as the district court held that the application note was 
inapplicable because, notwithstanding the partial 
suspension of sentence, the circuit court imposed a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year for the crack cocaine 
offense. We exercise plenary review on this appeal involving 
the interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., 
United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 713 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 




McKenzie's argument is not complicated. He points to 
U.S.S.G. SS 4A1.2(b)(1) and (2) which provide that "[t]he 
term `sentence of imprisonment' means a sentence of 
incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence 
imposed" but that "[i]f part of a sentence of imprisonment 
was suspended, `sentence of imprisonment' refers only to 
the portion that was not suspended." The difficulty with 
McKenzie's position is, however, obvious as U.S.S.G 
S 4A1.2(b) defines "sentence of imprisonment" for purposes 
of computing a defendant's criminal history category, a 
subject not at issue in this case. Thus, U.S.S.G. S 4A1.2(b), 
which we emphasize refers to "sentence of imprisonment" 
rather than "term of imprisonment" as used in Application 
note 5, is not implicated here. 
 
What is implicated here is 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(48)(B) which 
provides that "[a]ny reference to term of imprisonment or a 
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include 
the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a 
court of law, regardless of any suspension of the imposition 
or execution of that imprisonment or sentence or execution 
of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part." 
Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2, which defines terms 
for "purposes of [that] guideline," incorporates the definition 
of aggravated felony in the last paragraph of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43) which uses the phrase "term of imprisonment" 
as defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(48)(B). 
 
As we have indicated, McKenzie pleaded guilty to a 
violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326 because he re-entered the 
United States after his conviction for an aggravated felony. 
Inasmuch as U.S.S.G. S 2L1.2 implements 8 U.S.C. S 1326, 
it follows inexorably that within the meaning of Application 
Note 5 McKenzie was convicted of an aggravated felony in 
which the term of imprisonment did exceed one year. 
Consequently, the district court interpreted the guidelines 
correctly. Finally, we point out that our result is in accord 
with United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d 1038, 
1039-40 (10th Cir. 1999), which the parties indicate is the 
only published opinion directly on point. 
 




For the foregoing reasons the judgment of conviction and 
sentence entered November 4, 1998, will be affirmed. 
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